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Abstract—Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the most recent stan-
dard in mobile communications, introduced by 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP). Most of the formal security analysis
works in literature about LTE analyze authentication procedures,
while interoperability is far less considered. This paper presents
a formal security analysis of the interoperability procedures be-
tween LTE and the older Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS) networks, when mobile devices seamlessly switch
between the two technologies. The ProVerif tool has been used
to conduct the verification. The analysis shows that security
properties (secrecy of keys, including backward/forward secrecy,
immunity from off-line guessing attacks and network components
authentication) hold almost as expected, if all the protections
allowed by the LTE standard are adopted. If backhauling traffic
is not protected with IPSec, which is a common scenario since
the use of IPSec is not mandatory, some security properties still
hold while others are compromised. Consequently, user’s traffic
and network’s nodes are exposed to attacks in this scenario.
Index Terms—Formal verification; LTE; UMTS; ProVerif;
handover; security
I. INTRODUCTION
Fourth generation (4G) mobile networks are rapidly spread-
ing out. Long Term Evolution (LTE), which is an evolu-
tion of the previous third generation (3G) Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS), is already available
in many countries. For a considerable period of time these
two technologies will co-exist, because the new devices on
the market, such as smartphones, at this time support both
connection technologies.
An important difference between 3G and 4G networks is
that the latter have a flat-IP architecture (all network devices
communicate over IP technology), unlike 3G, where communi-
cations between devices use radio channels with multiple access
technologies. The differences between the two technologies
require non-trivial procedures for 3G-4G interoperability. The
3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project)[1] has defined such
procedures, in order to ensure continuity of service to users
who move, for example, from an area which is covered by
both 4G and 3G networks to an area with only 3G network
coverage or vice versa.
Formal verification is a well-known technique that can be
used to perform a thorough analysis of a communication
protocol, in order to identify the presence of bugs in its
design or to prove its correctness. In the case of cryptographic
protocols, formal verification can identify possible attacks on
the protocol or prove that no attacks are possible under certain
assumptions. In the past, formal verification has already been
applied to security protocols for mobile networks. In particular,
many works in the literature have formally analyzed the basic
procedures for authenticating users in 3G and in 4G networks,
while a smaller number of studies has been devoted to the
procedures which allow user mobility in these networks. As a
consequence, not all the possible mobility scenarios already
have a formal analysis.
The so called Intra-Handover procedures adopted when a user
moves between different LTE cells have been recently analyzed
in [2], while a formal analysis of the handover procedures that
enable users to seamlessly switch from a 3G to a 4G connection,
and vice versa, have not yet been analyzed.
This paper presents a formal analysis that fills this gap. The
procedures analyzed in this paper have been defined by 3GPP
as IRAT (Inter-Radio Access Technology) handover procedures,
i.e. procedures in which it is necessary to map the existing
security context (ciphering keys, user data) in the transition
between two different technologies (such as for example from
LTE to UMTS). The tool used for formal analysis is ProVerif
[3], which is an automatic formal verifier for cryptographic
protocols. ProVerif is based on symbolic Dolev-Yao models
[4], where cryptography is assumed to be perfect (e.g. the
attacker cannot decipher a message unless he knows the correct
deciphering key) and the attacker is assumed to have full access
to public communication channels, on which he can read, delete
and send messages (any message that the attacker can create
with its current knowledge can be sent by the attacker on public
channels).
The security properties that are considered in this paper
are secrecy of all the keys used before, during and after the
handovers, secrecy of payloads exchanged and authentication
between network components. In addition to the bare security
properties mentioned above, this work also analyses some
more specific cryptographic properties: backward and forward
secrecy of keys, conditional secrecy of payloads (i.e. secrecy
that must hold only when optional encryption of data is
enabled) and immunity from off-line guessing attacks. The
results that have been obtained show that in some particular
scenarios, allowed by the standards, and common in real
network deployments where IP network security mechanisms
are omitted, the aforementioned security properties in the
models that have been developed are only in part assured.
In these cases, confidentiality of user data traffic is not always
provided, and the lack of authentication between network
elements makes injection of fake signalling messages possible.
This kind of result may be interesting especially for mobile
operators, who have to assess security risks in their networks.
The complete ProVerif handover models are available for
download at the URL http://staff.polito.it/riccardo.sisto/lte.umts.
handover/models.zip
The remainer of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives some background about LTE and UMTS network
architectures, key hierarchies and ProVerif. Then, Section III
explains the handover procedures that have been analyzed and
Section IV the expected security properties that have been
specified. Finally, Section V presents the results of the formal
analysis and the potential threats that could be used to break into
the networks, Section VI discusses related work and Section VII
concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. LTE and UMTS overview
This section presents the basic concepts of 3G and 4G mobile
networks, which are essential in order to understand the work
presented in this paper. For further details, refer to the 3GPP
specifications [1].
Figure 1a shows the architecture of a UMTS network.
The different components are grouped into three domains:
the Mobile Station (MS), Serving Network (SN) and Home
Network (HN). The MS domain is composed of the Mobile
Equipment (ME), which is the mobile device, and the Universal
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The latter contains a
worldwide unique identification number, called International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), and other information
shared with the Authentication Center (AuC) of the mobile
operator (more details to follow). The Universal Terrestrial
Radio Access Network (UTRAN) is the access network for
UMTS networks. The UTRAN is composed of Radio Network
Controllers (RNCs) and base stations, called NodeB. The RNC
is the control unit of the UTRAN network (a single RNC
can control a large number of NodeB, which have minimal
functionality and mainly propagate messages between MS and
RNC). The SN may belong to the same provider of the USIM
or to another provider, in areas not covered by the network
of provider of the USIM. The SN is composed of Mobile
Switching Centers (MSC) and Visitor Location Registers (VLR).
An MSC is able to manage several UTRAN networks. The
VLR records information of the MS attached to the network and
keeps track of the MS positions. The home network contains the
MSC (the operation is similar to those of the SN), and Home
Location Registers (HLR), which contain persistent information
on registered operator users, and records the locations of users.
Finally, the AuC contains authentication data shared with the
USIM. These data are stored permanently in the USIM and
AuC when the USIM is made, in addition to the information
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Fig. 1. UMTS and LTE network architectures
of the operator, IMSI and the secret key Ki. The IMSI value
is public, and can be read from the device that mounts the
USIM. The key, however, must remain secret, and must never
be revealed by USIM and AuC. For this reason, the USIM
provides functions, accessible to the ME, that can be used
during the authentication phase in order to obtain temporary
keys from Ki. In this way, the secret Ki is never revealed to
the ME.
Figure 1b depicts the architecture of an LTE network.
Unlike the UTRAN, where a RNC controls many NodeB,
the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-
UTRAN) is composed of only one type of element: the
Evolved NodeB (eNodeB or eNB). A Home-eNB (HeNB)
performs the same function of an eNodeB, but is optimized
for deployment for smaller coverage than macro eNodeB,
such as indoor premises and public hotspots. Thus, in the
following of the paper the acronym eNB will be used to refer
both to eNodeB and Home-eNB. The eNB are “logically”
connected directly to the Mobility Management Entity (MME).
In reality, if the eNB-MME connections are protected with
IPsec, as 3GPP specification recommends, security gateways
are placed between E-UTRAN and MME to terminate IPsec
tunnels. However, using IPsec tunnels is at discretion of network
operators. Features that were performed by RNC in the UMTS
have now been distributed between eNB and MME. The MME
is the main control component for the access network and
initiates the authentication process, keeps track of the positions
of MS, retrieves subscriptions of MS by HN, and manages
connectivity. In LTE, the “concatenation” of HLR and AuC is
represented by the Home Subscriber Server (HSS), a single
component that combines the functionality of HLR and AuC.
Key hierarchy in LTE and differences with UMTS. The first
procedure done by a mobile device that wants to connect
to the network is the authentication and key agreement
procedure (called AKA). The objective of this procedure is
to establish the keys to be used in cryptographic operations
during communication between mobile device and network.
The keys are derived from the shared key Ki and some randomly
generated values. Details of authentication procedures can be
found in [1] (TS 33.401). The keys are renewed periodically
to prevent possible attacks due to encryption of large volumes
of data with the same keys.
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Fig. 2. LTE and UMTS key hierarchies
The AKA procedure in UMTS networks determines two keys:
the Cipher Key (CK) and the Integrity Key (IK), respectively
used to encrypt and check the integrity of data exchanged
between MS and RNC. UMTS defines only one class of
traffic between MS and the network. Thus, only one pair of
keys is established (Figure 2, right side), that is used for all
communications between MS and RNC.
The LTE technology introduces significant differences in
key management [1] (TS 33.821). LTE uses different keys for
different protocols used between the terminal and the different
components of the serving network. These keys are organized
in a hierarchy as shown in Figure 2 (left side). At the top
(root), the key Ki shared between USIM and AuC. The other
keys are derived from Ki, following the levels of the hierarchy
from top to bottom. Each level of the hierarchy indicates which
parts of the network know the keys in the level. As expected,
the mobile device knows all the keys except Ki. As in UMTS,
starting from the key Ki, the CK and IK keys are derived, even
if they are not actually used for encryption and integrity in
LTE networks, but rather are used to derive the successive keys.
LTE provides two mechanisms of protection for two different
classes of control traffic (Control Plane): the first is the Non
Access Stratum (NAS), and the second is the Access Stratum
(AS). NAS traffic consist of communications between MME
and MS (forwarded in a “transparent” way through the eNB),
while AS traffic (also called Radio Resource Control (RRC)
traffic) represents the control messages between MS and eNB.
For this reason, two keys are derived from KASME, KNASenc and
KNASint, respectively used for encryption and integrity checking
of NAS messages. Similarly, from KeNB, the keys KRRCenc and
KRRCint are derived and used for AS messages. The user traffic,
which belongs to the user plane, is encrypted using a different
key, called KUPenc. Integrity protection is not supported for this
class of traffic.
Finally, after a successful handover of the MS between
two neighbor eNB, it is necessary to renew the KeNB [1] (TS
33.401). To do this, the MME derives a new value from the
key KASME, called Next Hop key, which is used, along with the
previous KeNB, to generate the KeNB key (called K?eNB) used
by the target eNB after the handover. Further details on these
procedures and their analysis can be found in [1] (TS 23.401
and TS 33.401) and [2] respectively.
B. ProVerif overview
ProVerif [3] is a tool for automatic formal verification of
cryptographic protocols based on theorem-proving, where the
protocol actors and the attacker are modeled according to the
symbolic approach defined by Dolev-Yao [4]. In this model,
the attacker has complete control over public communications
channels and can read, delete, and modify messages in transit
over them or forge new messages. Private channels, instead,
are not accessible by the attacker. They are used to model
secure channels (e.g. channels with wire-level protection). The
symbolic representation of data and cryptography implies that
encryption is considered ideal.
As the possible behaviors of the attacker are already pre-
defined by the Dolev-Yao approach, when using ProVerif it
is enough to model the trusted actors of the protocol, while
the attacker model is already available inside ProVerif. An
important feature of ProVerif is its ability to model and analyze
an unlimited number of sessions of the protocol, even running
in parallel, differently from model checkers, which can only
analyze bounded systems.
Because of the inherent undecidability of the formal verifi-
cation problem, ProVerif may report false attacks, i.e. attacks
which in reality are not possible. As a consequence, when an
attack is reported by ProVerif, in the form of an execution trace
that violates the specified property, it is necessary to carefully
analyze it in order to understand if it is a real attack. However,
if a property is reported as satisfied, then it is guaranteed to
be true (ProVerif builds a formal proof for it), and no attack
is feasible in the model.
III. HANDOVER PROCEDURES
Handover procedures are activated by the serving network
(eNB in LTE, RNC in UMTS) when the strength of the
radio signal between mobile station and the current eNB/RNC
becomes too much degraded. The decision of performing an
handover is taken by the eNB or RNC, which selects the target
eNB/RNC from a list of neighbors (the list is previously known).
When a neighbor with the same technology (LTE/UMTS) is
not available for the handover, then an handover to a network
with other technology is executed.
Inter Radio Access Technology (Inter-RAT) handovers allow
voice and data service to maintain the connection while moving
from a radio access technology (GSM, UMTS, LTE, WiMAX
or any other wireless technology) to another.
Figure 3 depicts the simplified message exchange flow
performed during Inter-RAT handover from LTE to UMTS,
as modeled in ProVerif for the verification of the handover
procedure. This model has been derived from the 3GPP TS
23.401 and TS 33.401 [1] specifications but it contains only
data and operations related to cryptography and authentication,
while resource allocation and relocation have been omitted,
because they are not relevant for the analysis performed by
ProVerif.
Figure 3 starts with a set of interactions between MS and
MME which are not real message exchanges but are used
in the model in order to create the same security context
that is assumed to be established by the AKA procedure. In
particular, for each protocol session, a fresh IMSI is generated,
a nondeterministic choice is made to decide whether encryption
will be activated or not for that session, and a fresh KASME key
(which in reality is established during the AKA) is generated.
Encryption selection and KASME are inserted as values into two
perfect hash tables named capab and keys, bound to the
corresponding IMSI, which is used as a key in the tables. These
tables are private, i.e. not accessible by the attacker, and shared
with the MME. In this way it is ensured that in this phase the
KASME is not revealed to the attacker but it is shared by MS
and MME, as guaranteed by the AKA procedure. At the same
time, IMSI and encryption selection are also transmitted on the
public channel from MS to MME thus allowing the attacker
to get them, as their secrecy is not guaranteed by the AKA
procedure. Key KeNB is derived from KASME and transmitted
on the channel between MME and eNB.
The third message (named payloadLTE) represents a
user data plane exchange between MS and eNB done before
the handover procedure. The handover is activated by the
eNB with the HANDOVER REQUIRED message, which
informs the MME that the procedure must be performed for
the user identified by the IMSI contained in the message.
The MME derives the new CK′ and IK′ UMTS keys from
the previous KASME and the NAS downlink count value. The
FORWARD RELOCATION REQUEST message provides the
target MSC with the two keys and the IMSI. The MSC
provides the target RNC with the keys just received and the
user identity (RELOCATION REQUEST message). Now the
RNC has all the information required to communicate with
the MS. RELOCATION REQUEST ACK and FORWARD
RELOCATION RESPONSE messages are used to inform that
the target UMTS network is ready to accept the connection from
the MS. The HANDOVER COMMAND is a NAS message that
provides the MS with the data (NAS downlink count) required
for the derivation of CK′ and IK′ in the MS. Then the MS sends
an HANDOVER TO UTRAN COMPLETE message to the
target RNC for signalling that the MS is ready to use the UMTS
network. Finally, two messages are used to establish and agree
upon the encryption algorithm, using the SMC (SECURITY
MODE COMMAND) and the SMC COMPLETE messages.
The last message (named payloadUMTS) represents data
exchange after the handover.
The handover from UMTS to LTE is similar to the previous
one, but with the network roles reversed. The RNC takes the
decision to initiate an handover, and sends a RELOCATION
REQUIRED message to the connected MSC. The core of the
procedure is still carried out by the MME, which receives
a FORWARD RELOCATION REQUEST containing the MS
identity and the UMTS CK/IK keys. The MME computes
the new LTE keys following these steps: (i) generates a fresh
nonce, (ii) uses a derivation function to obtain a K′ASME key
from the nonce, CK and IK received from MSC, (iii) derives
the new KeNB, KNASenc and KNASint keys from K′ASME. Then,
the MME sends the identity of the MS and the KeNB key to
the target eNB, which can activate the access procedures with
the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message.
Communication among components of the home and serving
network should be secured by the mobile operators who own
the networks. While the risk of attacks on the MME-MSC and
MSC-RNC links is not very relevant, because the involved
nodes are not physically accessible, the same is not true for
the HeNB-MME link, because Home-eNB nodes are often
located in publicly accessible locations, and hence they may
be tampered by a malicious attacker. The 3GPP TS 33.820 [1]
specification specifies that the eNB-MME connection should be
protected by IPsec, which guarantees authentication, integrity
and confidentiality of data. Moreover, Security Gateways
(SeGW) should be used to handle the IPsec connections
in the serving network. However, the 3GPP TS 33.401 [1]
specification reports that, if the interfaces are trusted (e.g.
physically protected), the use of IPsec based protection is not
needed, depending on operator evaluations. In practice, several
operators avoid using IPsec on their networks. Reasons might
be several: some fear that IPsec would increase both network
complexity and traffic latency, others simply underestimate
the problem as, for example, they assume that encryption is
performed by applications, which is not always true. A clear
presentation of all the possible motivations that are leading
several network operators to avoid using IPsec is available
in [5]. Given this scenario, in our analysis we assume that
the MME-MSC and MSC-RNC links are secure channels, not
accessible by the attacker, whereas for the eNB-MME link
we explore both the case that the channel is secured by IPsec,
and hence not accessible by the attacker, and the case that an
attacker may be able to control the channel between eNB and
MME, which is a possibility if the operator does not use the
IPsec protection for this channel and the attacker succeeds in
having access to a trusted interface.
IV. SECURITY PROPERTIES
The main security properties that the handover procedures
are expected to guarantee have been specified as follows:
• Secrecy of keys: all the keys involved in the handover
procedures must remain secret.
• Conditional secrecy of payloads: in UMTS and LTE,
encryption of data between MS and SN is optional,
but integrity protection is mandatory. Accordingly, the
private (i.e. initially not known to the attacker) terms
payloadLTE and payloadUMTS, used to represent
data transfer between MS and eNB/RNC, must be kept
secret if encryption is enabled.
• Forward secrecy and backward secrecy are properties
of key-agreement protocols. Forward secrecy means that
the compromise of a secret key must not affect the
confidentiality of future keys. In the same way, backward
secrecy means that the compromise of a secret key
must not affect the confidentiality of earlier keys. In the
handover from LTE to UMTS, forward secrecy is specified
as the inability of the attacker to derive UMTS keys (CK′,
IK′) when he knows KeNB. Likewise, in the handover
from UMTS to LTE, forward secrecy is specified as the
MS eNB MME
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Derive keys from KASME
IMSI, KENB
Derive keys from KENB
payload LTE
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integrity protected with IK’
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Fig. 3. LTE to UMTS handover
inability of the attacker to derive LTE keys (K′ASME, KeNB)
when he knows CK and IK. Backward secrecy is defined
as the inability of the attacker to derive KeNB from CK′
and IK′ in the first case, and to derive CK and IK from
KeNB in the second case.
• Immunity from off-line guessing attacks: a term is a weak-
secret if it is vulnerable to brute-force off-line guessing,
and the attacker has the ability to verify if a guessed value
is indeed the weak-secret without further interaction after
an execution of the protocol. In the handover models, the
payloads payloadLTE and payloadUMTS represent
data that could be guessed, so it is specified that they
must not be weak-secrets.
• Authentication: the following authentication properties
between the MS and the SN (eNB and RNC) are specified
in the model: (i) the MS is authenticated to the source
network, (ii) the MS is authenticated to the target network,
(iii) each time the MS successfully concludes an handover,
then the MME previously derived the same keys (K′ASME
or CK′/IK′).
As already explained, both the handover types have been
analyzed, considering both the possibility that the eNB-MME
link includes IPsec protection, or lacks it. This produces two
different models for each handover type: the two models differ
only in the definition of the eNB-MME channel (private in the
first case, public in the latter case).
The complete ProVerif handover models are available for
download at the URL http://staff.polito.it/riccardo.sisto/lte.umts.
handover/models.zip
V. RESULTS AND SECURITY ISSUES
Table I resumes the results of the formal analysis of the
handover models.
The second column of Table I contains the results of the
analysis of the handover from LTE to UMTS, when the channel
between eNB and MME is private (i.e. IPsec protection is
enabled). These results confirm that all the expected properties
hold: all keys (KASME, KeNB and derived) remain secret; forward
LTE to UMTS UMTS to LTE
eNB-MME channel private public private public
Secrecy of keys true
false for KeNB and keys derived
from KeNB, true for the other keys
true
false for KeNB and keys derived
from KeNB, true for the other keys
Conditional secrecy of LTE
payload true false true false
Conditional secrecy of UMTS
payload true true true true
Forward secrecy true true false false
Backward secrecy true false true true
Immunity from off-line
guessing attacks true
false for payloadLTE, true for
payloadUMTS true
false for payloadLTE, true for
payloadUMTS
Auth. MS-eNB true false true false
Auth. MS-MME true true true true
Auth. MS-RNC true true true true
TABLE I
ANALYSIS RESULTS
and backward secrecy are valid; the payloads are conditionally
secret and are not weak-secrets, and authentication properties
hold.
The third column of Table I refers to the same LTE to
UMTS model, but with a public eNB-MME channel (the
adversary can spoof, delete and transmit new messages over
the channel). In this scenario, the attacker can know a subset
of the LTE keys: KeNB and the derived keys KRRCenc, KRRCint
and KUPenc. However, KASME and the UMTS keys (CK′/IK′)
are kept secret. The disclosure of KeNB makes the LTE payload
not secret (the attacker can derive the ciphering key KUPenc),
which also invalids the immunity from guessing attacks on the
LTE payload. Instead, the secrecy of the UMTS payload is
preserved, because CK remains secret, as well as the immunity
from guessing attacks on the UMTS payload. In this scenario,
backward secrecy is not valid: the attacker directly knows KeNB.
Instead, forward secrecy is kept: the attacker never knows
KASME, so he has no way to derive CK′ and IK′. Finally,
the authentication between MS and eNB does not hold: an
attacker can force an handover of the MS from LTE to UMTS.
In fact, the attacker, knowing the IMSI and having access
to the eNB-MME channel, can initiate an arbitrary handover
by sending a forged HANDOVER REQUIRED message to
the MME. The MS cannot recognize the attacker because
the handover procedure continues as in a regular handover,
and receives a genuine HANDOVER COMMAND message
from the network. The attacker never knows the KASME key:
if the handover completes in the MS, then the MME must
have previously derived, in a corresponding session, the CK′
and IK′ keys from KASME, so MME and MS are correctly
authenticated during the handover. Similarly, the attacker has
no access to the 3G serving network and, from the previous
properties, to the CK′ and IK′ keys: the attacker cannot alter
communications between RNC and MS and, when the handover
procedure completes, MS and UMTS SN are authenticated.
The same considerations made for the two previous scenarios
are also applicable to the other handover procedure, from
UMTS to LTE (fourth and fifth columns in Table I), with only
some differences. The only results that differ are the ones
about forward and backward key secrecy. In this handover
scenario, forward secrecy does not hold because if the attacker
knows CK and IK, he can decrypt all the messages between
MS and the UMTS network. In this way, the adversary can
read the nonce, transmitted from the RNC to the MS, that
is used by MME and MS, along with CK and IK, to derive
the K′ASME key, and subsequently all the LTE keys. Instead,
backward secrecy holds: an attacker who knows KeNB cannot
derive the previous CK and IK keys. It is worth noting that
each property has been verified independently, this implies
that, for example, the secrecy of the UMTS payload holds
even if the attacker is assumed to know CK and IK when
performing the backward secrecy verification in the UMTS
to LTE handover. In fact, when verifying backward/forward
secrecy, the keys are intentionally disclosed to the attacker,
while the same does not happen during verification of other
properties.
The results about authentication are the same, albeit their
explanation is different. Lack of authentication between MS
and eNB, in the last scenario, makes the adversary able to alter
all subsequent Access Stratum and User Plane communications
between MS and eNB. However, the attacker cannot read
and modify Non Access Stratum messages between MS and
MME. For this reason MS-MME authentication remains valid:
if the handover completes in the MS, then the MME ran a
session where the KASME key was derived, so MME and MS
are authenticated during the handover. Finally, before starting
the handover, MS-RNC are authenticated, as confirmed by the
last query, because the attacker has no access to the UMTS
network.
VI. RELATED WORK
The most closely related work is a recent paper by Ben Henda
and Norrman [2] who used ProVerif to analyze the LTE
procedures for session management (used to establish security
algorithms between the mobile device and the network) and
mobility (handover between two LTE cells). The procedures
analyzed are: Network Access Stratum security control proce-
dure, i.e. security algorithm negotiation between mobile device
and MME, NAS Service Request Procedure (security algorithm
negotiation between mobile device and eNodeB), X2 handover
(handover between two eNodeB without MME intervention),
and S1 handover (handover between two eNodeB with MME
intervention). Results of the analysis show that secrecy and
agreement properties hold as expected. Differently from our
work, the analysis in [2] does not consider the possibility that
data encryption may be disabled as allowed by the standard
[1] (TS 33.401) nor does it check immunity from guessing
attacks.
In general, the research community manly focused on
analyzing the AKA procedure and on proposing improvements
in that procedure ( [6], [7], [8] and [9] ). LTE and UMTS
authentication procedures are very similar. Only computation
of keys and used algorithms differ. The UMTS AKA was
formally analyzed using BAN logic in TS 33.902 [1] and, due
to the similarity of the procedures, all analysis results carry
over to LTE AKA.
Arapinis et al. [10] used ProVerif to analyze privacy aspects
of UMTS. As the paging procedure analyzed is the same in
LTE and UMTS technologies, the results are valid for both
networks.
Qachri et al. [11] proposed and analyzed a system for
handovers between different wireless network technologies
(e.g. 3G, 4G, WiFi, WiMax). The proposed system has been
formally verified with ProVerif. However, the paper does not
provide an analysis of the LTE network defined by 3GPP
standards.
VII. CONCLUSION
LTE is the most recent standard in communication systems
developed by 3GPP. This paper presented a formal security
analysis of handover procedures between LTE and UMTS
networks using symbolic models based on perfect cryptography
assumptions. The tool used to formalize models and to verify
procedures is ProVerif. Up to our knowledge, this is the first
work that has formally analyzed the security of LTE-UMTS
handover procedures. The properties that have been verified
are: secrecy of ciphering and integrity keys, conditional secrecy
of payloads, forward and backward secrecy of keys, immunity
from guessing attacks on payloads and authentication between
network components.
3GPP specifies that mobile operators can decide to omit
IPsec protection on eNB-MME channels, if the interfaces are
trusted. However, a definition of “trusted” is not given by 3GPP
specifications, but it is left to the mobile operators’ discretion.
As currently several operators do not protect the eNB-MME
channels, the analysis was conducted by considering both the
cases of protected and unprotected eNB-MME channels.
Results confirm that, under the assumptions made, almost all
the properties that have been considered hold when eNB-MME
channels are protected. The only property that does not hold
is forward secrecy (as defined in Section IV) in the UMTS
to LTE handover. Instead, all properties hold in the LTE to
UMTS handover.
In the case of unprotected eNB-MME channels, results show
which properties are broken and which remain valid under
the assumptions made. When having access to the eNB-MME
channels, an attacker can force an handover from LTE to UMTS,
or control the Access Stratum and User Plane communications
after an handover from UMTS to LTE. However, the main LTE
key (KASME) and the UMTS keys (CK′/IK′) are kept secret.
Future works will address the verification of other LTE
handover procedures, for example handover between LTE and
other network technologies (e.g. WiFi, WiMax).
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